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Introduction
Problems of mechanisms of thinking in many ways 
remain unresolved. An answer to Kant’s question 
“How can synthetic judgments be a priori?” posed 
240 years ago has not yet been found. Indeed, 
despite significant progress made in the creation 
of artificial intelligence systems, these systems still 
cannot understand, acquire knowledge, create new 
concepts, etc. These properties are most fundamental 
to intellect and represent the greatest limitation of 
artificial systems. A number of authors believe that 
this challenge is not surmountable in principle and 
that a strong AI (completely coinciding with human 
intellect) will never be created.
Consideration of artificial intelligence in this 
regard is fundamentally important, as in this case we 
are dealing with systems, the structures of which we 
know. In regard to human thinking, the situation is 
different - we do not know exactly which structures 
store information and how such information is 
processed. This has given rise to the most important 
problem of what is innate and what is not.
Problems of cognition and thinking are at the 
intersection of different sciences (see for example, 
Miller, 2003) (Fig. 1).
However, the synthesis of these sciences in 
relation to problems of cognition has not yet taken 
place. Scientists of various cognitive sciences such as 
linguistics, epistemology, the philosophy of science, 
artificial intelligence, etc. do not often refer to one 
another’s work. In particular, there is no single 
ABSTRACT 
Problems with mechanisms of thinking and cognition in many ways remain unresolved. Why are a priori inferences 
possible? Why can a human understand but a computer cannot? It has been shown that when creating new concepts, 
generalization is contradictory in the sense that to be created concepts must exist a priori, and therefore, they are 
not new. The process of knowledge acquisition is also contradictory, as it inevitably involves recognition, which can 
be realized only when there is an a priori standard. Known approaches of the framework of artificial intelligence (in 
particular, Bayesian) do not determine the origins of knowledge, as these approaches are effective only when “good” 
hypotheses are made. The formation of “good” hypotheses must occur a priori. To address these issues and paradoxes, 
a fundamentally new approach to problems of cognition that is based on completely innate behavioral programs is proposed. 
The process of cognition within the framework of the concept of a quantum metalanguage involves the selection of adequate 
a priori existing (innate) programs (logical variables and rules for working with them) that are most adequate to a given 
situation. The quantum properties of this metalanguage are necessary to implement such programs.
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approach to a major cognitive problem - the problem 
of knowledge acquisition. Thus, a new cognitive 
synthesis is needed.
Several approaches to the problem of cognition 
have been developed. A number of these approaches 
are based on the idea of the brain as a special structure 
that cannot be realized within the framework of 
any computing system. One objection to strong AI 
is Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. A number of 
articles (see, for example, Penrose, 1994) state that 
a human understands, which is not provable, and 
that the difference between a human’s thinking and a 
computer system is based on Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorem, which concludes that thinking uses non-
computable means. Another objection to strong AI is 
Searle’s Chinese Room (1980), which is also related 
to the term understanding, with which, in the author’s 
opinion, no formal artificial system is endowed. At 
the same time, the term understanding is poorly 
defined by the authors. Thus, a certain indeterminate 
property (or a set of properties such as the ability to 
acquire knowledge, to make generalizations, etc.) is 
attributed to a human, but proving anything under 
these conditions is difficult.
A potentially radical solution to the problem 
of acquiring knowledge is rooted in an assumption 
of innateness (partial or complete). Within the 
framework of the philosophy of science, this line of 
reasoning is connected to Fodor (1983). Chomsky, 
based on other considerations, came to a similar 
conclusion on innate language (Chomsky, 1957; 
2014). However, this approach requires justification 
with the use of models and generalizations on 
thinking in the broadest sense of the word.
Some authors (see, for example, Aerts et al., 
2011; Aerts et al., 2013; Pothos and Busemeyer, 
2013; Khrennikov, 1999; Khrennikov, 2010a; 
Basieva et al., 2017) believe that a number of 
problems related to thinking can be solved within 
the framework of quantum mechanics. Korf, (2014) 
considered potential quantum effects on brain 
activity in a neurobiological context. The author 
considered three types of theories according to 
which the working of the brain is related to quantum 
mechanics. The first states that quantum mechanics 
are involved in the behaviors of molecules but are not 
related to higher brain functions or consciousness. 
The second states that the brain is viewed as part 
of a world based on quantum mechanics (Hameroff 
and Penrose, 2014, Smith, 2006; 2009). The third 
uses quantum mechanics to model mental processes 
and can be classified as quantum-like, as the authors 
view quantum mechanics as a convenient formalism 
for solving a number of decision-making problems.
One of the motivations of applying quantum 
mechanics to processes of thinking was experiments 
on decision making. Such experiments examine, for 
example, the Elsberg paradox, the breaking of the 
sure-thing principle, and other phenomena. In (de 
Barros, 2012; Khrennikov, 2011; Aerts et al., 2011; 
Basti et al., 2017) it was shown that the formalism 
of quantum mechanics can help explain these 
paradoxes. However, a question remains as to how 
this quantum(-like) behavior is realized. Which 
structures of the brain are responsible for it?
Thus, quantum mechanics has proven useful 
for modeling the workings of cognitive functions. The 
purpose of this article is to go further and show that 
quantum mechanics can be used to solve the most 
fundamental problems of thinking, such as those of 
knowledge acquisition, understanding, new concept 
generation, etc. The very phenomenon of thinking is 
systemic in nature, and thus a systems approach must 
be applied to problems of thinking in general and to 
problems of acquiring knowledge in particular.
The problem of human consciousness is not 
considered in this work. This, while related to the 
problem of knowledge acquisition, is another matter 
to which the great literature is devoted (Chalmers, 
1996; Dennett, 2005).
Searle’s Chinese room, objections to strong AI and the 
problem of knowledge acquisition
Central to the problem of cognition is understanding.
There are two different aspects of 
understanding. The first is related to adequate 
actions that show that a human (the intellectual 
Figure 1. Cognition at the intersection of different sciences
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system) really understands what is in front of him 
or her. The second is related to consciousness and 
to feelings about what one sees. Feelings (qualia) 
are thus attributed only to humans and not to an 
arbitrary intellectual system. In this article we only 
consider the first aspect of understanding. It is this 
aspect that has a direct bearing on the problem of 
knowledge acquisition, which is the main focus of 
this article. For the second aspect, research on it has 
a long history and several articles have been devoted 
to it (see for example, Yampolskiy, 2017). Studying 
and modeling this second aspect is difficult because 
it is difficult to measure in an objective and human-
independent manner.
By understanding we of course refer to an 
understanding of something new. Otherwise we are 
considering an already known object, in relation to 
which we can act adequately, i.e., its understanding 
is a priori present.
One of the key thought experiments conducted 
on this topic was Searle’s Chinese Room experiment.
In 1980, Searle (1980), with the help of a 
thought experiment entitled “The Chinese Room”, put 
forward a serious objection to the existence of strong 
AI. In fact, this objection is critical to understanding 
thinking as such. In the mental experiment, a human 
in a room could communicate with the outside world 
only with instructions written in Chinese, which he 
did not know. Comments made on the instructions 
were written in English. However, the instructions 
were designed in such a way that they could be 
executed with the help of comments but without 
understanding what exactly is being done.
As a result, Searle concludes that while such a 
system can pass a Turing test, no understanding of 
the language of the system is given, meaning that 
the Turing test is not an adequate test of cognitive 
abilities. Searle’s arguments are aimed at criticizing 
the view of “strong” artificial intelligence, according 
to which computers equipped with a corresponding 
program can understand natural language and 
possess other mental abilities peculiar to people. 
The hypothesis of weak artificial intelligence only 
suggests that computers are capable of imitating a 
human’s mental abilities, which corresponds to the 
mental experiments conducted by Searle.
As Searle noted, syntax is not sufficient for 
semantics.
The problem here is that within the framework 
of this thought experiment the term understanding 
is poorly defined. The author believes that this is 
something that is taken for granted. However, the 
absence of a definition given explicitly does not allow 
us to conclude whether an artificial intelligence 
system is able to understand or whether it merely 
imitates this process.
A large number of articles have been published 
on the problem of the Chinese Room (see for example 
Chalmers, 1996; Barsalou, 1999; Bishop et al., 2013). 
Quantum versions of the Chinese Room have also 
been developed. For example, Maruyama (2016) 
considered another argument of Searle based upon 
the observer-relativity of computation. According 
to the author, calculations are dependent on the 
observer but human intellect is not. Therefore, 
intellect cannot be simulated through calculations. 
Calculations must instead be interpreted by someone 
(that is, understood). The author considered the 
quantum mechanics of categories, from which 
quantum linguistics arose.
A definition of understanding can be given 
based on experiments that determine whether 
a system (human) behaves appropriately after 
receiving information from outside or not. What 
does it mean, for example, to understand the term 
“electrical socket”? It means that a human can use 
this tool to perform certain actions (turn on a table 
lamp, etc.). If this term is written, for example, in 
Vietnamese, which the person does not know, then 
the actions of the human will not be adequate, i.e., 
actions are given no value as a result of receiving 
such a message.
Here, it is necessary to note the importance 
of the recognition procedure, which has typically 
received little attention in reference to the context of 
the problem under consideration. This procedure in 
its most general form involves the comparison of an 
image obtained by receptors to some standard. As a 
result, two options may be available: the image may 
coincide with the standard (correspond to it) or not. 
For the first case, it is known what the image is, as a 
priori programs work with this standard and generate 
adequate results, etc. Rather, the first case corresponds 
to the achievement of understanding. However, in 
this case we do not understand something new. In 
the second case, when an image is not recognized, no 
a priori programs are involved, adequate behavior is 
not realized, and no understanding is achieved. This 
is a general procedure (which underlies large subject 
- pattern recognition) that is not directly related to 
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image processing methods, information transferring, 
physical media, etc. That is, such a procedure 
should be used in both living and artificial systems. 
If the Chinese language is not determined based on 
standards within an artificial intellectual system, 
then it cannot act adequately in this regard, i.e., the 
system does not understand it.
When a human is able to understand (as 
manifested in adequate actions) what is written 
in Chinese (never having studied it before), then 
this is possible only in one version - when this 
language nevertheless is a priori embedded in our 
consciousness as a standard. The application of this 
possibility is discussed in Section 7.
Other objections to strong AI have been put 
forward by Penrose (1994). Penrose also believes 
that intellect is an understanding that involves 
consciousness. In the opinion of the author, a 
distinction must be made between true intellect 
and attempts to model it. Penrose argues that 
understanding is not computable. As proof, he uses 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and concludes 
that conscious thinking has a non-computable 
component. The author, however, concludes that 
when the ability to understand is non-algorithmic, 
then it can be simply and easily explained through 
natural selection. As a means to solve this problem 
Penrose suggested that quantum events occurring in 
the microtubules of neurons are not computable.
Here, we would like to note that understanding 
does not have to involve consciousness. When an 
intelligent system of an arbitrary nature is capable of 
adequately responding to a certain set of symbols, we 
must conclude that it understands them. To ensure 
that it is conscious of them is quite difficult from 
an experimental point of view. The very concept of 
“consciousness” does not have a clear definition.
If understanding is considered in this context 
(as an adequate behavior), then different forms 
of understanding must occur at the molecular 
level (including neurons). Any cell, in addition to 
transforming and transporting substances, at the 
same time processes information. For example, in 
(Gorlich et al., 2011) the cell is considered a semantic 
system. The authors consider the codes that organize 
the semantic dimension of molecular information. 
Such operations implicitly involve recognition. If, 
for example, a membrane receptor recognizes an 
external signal (i.e., a reaction occurs between it 
and a certain molecule according to the key-lock 
principle), this results in the further processing of this 
signal, in its amplification, etc. We can state that the 
cell has “understood” the signal. This understanding 
is expressed as the cell’s adequate response to a certain 
change in the environment. However, in this case, the 
signal cannot be new for the cell or for an arbitrary system.
Thus, on one hand, the argument of the Chinese 
Room is important in the sense that it is possible to 
show through this framework that understanding 
(and as will be shown below its consequences such 
as the formation of new concepts, abstractions, etc.) 
cannot be obtained based on any formal procedures 
or programs developed accordingly. On the other 
hand, the Chinese Room itself is nothing special 
relative to other situations, as a human perceives 
the world around him or her only through receptors 
(senses). In this sense, we are all partially in the 
Chinese Room. How then do we understand anything 
new? If a child has learned a language, how does he 
manage to understand it? The assertions of many 
authors that a child is taught by trial and error cannot 
be accepted as satisfactory, as a computer can also 
act in such a way. In this case, an equally important 
question arises as to how many trials and errors are 
required? This question is considered below.
Objections like the Chinese Room are closely 
related to the problem of knowledge acquisition. As 
it was noted above, when a human or an intellectual 
system recognizes an environment with the help 
of receptors, only two possibilities are realized. 1 - 
The image that appears in the environment is not 
recognized, and as a result no a priori programs for 
working with it are available. As a result, behaviors 
will not become more adequate after the registration 
of this image. 2 - The image is recognized, but this 
can occur only when the system is given a priori 
standard for its recognition. In this case, the system’s 
behavior can become more adequate through the a 
priori application of behavior programs. However, 
knowledge acquisition in this case also does not 
occur, as programs of behavior existed in the system 
a priori. This problem is considered by Melkikh, 
(2014a). In particular, in (Melkikh, 2014a) two 
classes of behavior (Table 1) are distinguished for 
animals and arbitrary intellectual systems:
It is shown that the behavior of type B is 
contradictory and cannot be realized. According to 
(Melkikh, 2014a), such a system of recognition and 
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Property 1: The system contains internal 
independent objects (words of the language) Q1 ... Qn. 
Operations P1 ... Pm on objects are possible. Operations 
of new object (operation) creation are not defined.
Property 2: The system includes a receptor that 
receives information on the state of the environment. 
The receptor is capable of detecting objects q1 ... qm. 
In this case, operations p1 ... pk can be performed on 
objects. The receiving signal is compared to internal 
objects present in the system (pattern recognition). 
The system compares internal and external objects 
of the language. Mathematically, this comparison can 
be expressed in the form of equivalence (equality) of 
any internal object to some of the external objects.
Property 3: From recognition (matching), 
some internal object operations trigger effectors; 
the system acts on the external environment. Every 
action is evaluated using function ( )iil PQ ,Φ  (gain). 
This value is greater when the system is more 
successful. Without a loss of generality, we can 
assume that the system is designed such that there 
is a maximum condition: ( ) max, →Φ iil PQ . The term 
of “equivalence” is closely related to the gain and 
represents an adequate reflection of reality.
Property 4: The system has limited memory 
storage, which can store the results of previous 
measurements or of intermediate operations.
The pattern recognition and decision-making 
scheme can then be represented as the following 
form: (Fig.2)
Let image Ω appear to the organism (system) 
with properties 1-4, which can be described in terms 
of the external language of receptors (registered). 
However, no objects of the internal language are 
relevant (in terms of equivalence) to external 
language objects corresponding to this image. Then, 
the effector cannot perform operations or activities 
that lead the system to obtain a certain gain (payoff).
Consider a universal translator that translates 
one language into another and that can work with 
an unrecognized image. In this case, the algorithm 
cannot be run because the conditions required to run 
it, cannot be formulated.
Suppose that the operation of supplementing 
a list of operations and objects from external 
alphabet phrases exists. However, this operation is 
controversial because it can be only performed if an 
external alphabet is part of the internal alphabet. 
When a phrase is part of an internal alphabet, the 
registered object is recognized, contradicting the 
initial claim. In this context, language problems 
require separate consideration and are discussed 
below in paragraph 5.
In regard to pattern recognition and decision-
making, the next version of the statement is 
controversial: “to create a new standard requires 
a new standard.” When an image does not match 
an internal standard, the system must create a new 
standard to make an adequate decision. However, its 
creation is self-contradictory because the algorithm 
that creates such standards must know them in 
advance.
The contradictory nature of the acquisition of 
knowledge based on learning automata is represented 
by the following diagram (Melkikh, 2014a) (Fig. 3):
Thus, it is not clear how an arbitrary system 
acquires knowledge, as new information is not 
valuable, and valuable one is not new. That is, when 
Behavior based on innate 
programs (А)
Behavior based on knowledge 
acquisition (В)
Includes conditional and 
unconditional reflexes and the 
simplest forms of learning.
Includes learning experiences 
(interactions with other animals) 
and the logical formulation of new 
concepts.
An animal (intelligent system) 
meets a recognized object. This 
is accompanied by the running of 
innate programs. An unrecognized 
object can only trigger innate 
programs. An adequate response 
to the unrecognized object is 
impossible.
An animal (intelligent system) 
meets an unrecognized object and 
begins to respond to it adequately 
through the acquisition of 
knowledge. 
Table 1. Two classes of behavior are distinguished for animals and 
arbitrary intellectual systems (Melkikh 2014a).
? 
Image 
Operation 1 Operation 3 Operation 2 
Objects 
? 
Figure 2. The pattern recognition and decision-making scheme
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a human is able to understand something that is 
not available to a computer, then he is capable of 
acquiring knowledge.
Often, the acquisition of knowledge is associated 
with the concept of “intelligence.” There are many 
definitions of “intelligence” (see, for example, Legg 
and Hutter, 2007). For example, Gottfredson (1997) 
defines this concept as:
«A very general mental capability that, among 
other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve 
problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex 
ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience. It is 
not merely book learning, a narrow academic skill, 
or test-taking smarts. Rather, it reflects a broader 
and deeper capability for comprehending our 
surroundings—”catching on,” “making sense” of 
things, or “figuring out” what to do».
Thus, the problem of knowledge acquisition 
and the problem of understanding are closely related. 
To determine whether an arbitrary system is able to 
understand or acquire knowledge, it is necessary to 
explicitly take the recognition process into account.
Ascending and descending approaches to AI and the 
problem of knowledge acquisition 
In reference to the problems discussed above it is 
important to consider artificial intelligence systems, 
which are distinguished (from the brain) by the fact 
that their structures are known.
In artificial intelligence, two basic approaches 
are used: ascending and descending approaches. 
An ascending approach involves the use of neural 
networks, including promising newly developed 
networks of deep learning (see for example, LeCun et 
al., 2015; Sze et al., 2017). To train a neural network 
on something, we must explore a large collection of 
preliminary examples. Note that in these examples, 
someone (a human) must explicitly indicate what kind 
of thing it is. This instruction occurs in a special mode 
- the training mode. The neural network itself does 
not need to understand anything - it is understood 
by the one who teaches it, i.e., the human. In the case 
of unsupervised learning, neural networks are only 
capable of clustering information. In this case, there 
is no recognition.
Recently, the AlphaGo Zero algorithm achieved 
superhuman performance in the game of Go, Chess 
and other games using deep convolutional neural 
networks, trained solely by reinforcement learning 
from games of self-play (see, for example, Silver 
et al., 2017). It was demonstrated that a general-
purpose reinforcement learning algorithm can 
achieve, tabula rasa, (without any additional domain 
knowledge except the rules of the game) superhuman 
performance across many challenging domains. In 
this case, however, new images do not arise, and 
there is no understanding.
Note also that machine learning is applicable 
only to problems for which there are sufficient initial 
data (see for example Abu-Mostafa et al., 2012). 
Machine learning does not create information but 
rather uses it based on already available data. When 
there are not enough training data, machine learning 
Figure 3. The contradictory nature of knowledge acquisition and learning automaton
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methods do not work. It is also necessary to define the 
term “data.” Clearly, if these data do not correspond 
to the “meaning” a priori, it will not appear as a result 
of further training. The collation of meaning to a 
signal is a human’s task. 
The descending approach is related to the 
application of the Bayesian formula for conditional 
probabilities and generally theory of Bayesian 
networks. Hypotheses (generative models) are put 
forward and subsequently verified (see for example, 
Lake et al., 2015; Bonawitz et al., 2014). A Bayesian 
system can be trained on a small number of examples, 
but this requires the use of a set of hypotheses that 
the system itself cannot offer. Hypotheses are again 
formulated by those who understand (a human). This 
method is considered in more detail in the following 
section.
Several works have been devoted to children’s 
learning processes. A number of authors believe (see 
for example, Bonawitz et al., 2014) that children learn 
in a Bayesian manner. However, this raises question 
of who in this case forms hypotheses? When a 
hypothesis is formed by an external system (another 
human), then how does the trainee understand what 
is being said when first presented with this situation 
(new objects or images)? In the second case it can be 
assumed that hypotheses are congenital (i.e., they 
exist prior to the learning process).
It is often believed that children learn from 
examples by default, but this is not the case. For 
example, in (Melkikh, 2014a) social learning was 
considered. Social learning is often considered 
separately owing to its complexity and importance 
to complex communities (transfer of experience 
from parents to descendants and so on). However, in 
terms of the problem addressed in this article, social 
learning is not fundamentally different from other 
forms of learning. We consider a case in which an 
organism receives new information from its parents 
or from other animals. Can the organism adapt to 
new conditions in this case? Given what has been 
said above, the answer is no.
Importantly we note that in this case, the 
organism also receives information via receptors. 
Therefore, any other organism (a member of the 
flock, the parent, etc.) is interpreted as part of the 
environment. Consequently, the aforementioned 
scheme of measurement - recognition – decision 
making holds. Regardless of actions the parent takes, 
they can be adequately interpreted only in one case: 
when a signal has been recognized (compared to a 
standard sample). In turn, this comparison is only 
possible when a standard sample has already been 
made available to the organism (as congenital).
Note also that “supervised learning” in 
animals and humans is fundamentally different from 
“supervised learning” in neural networks, in that 
a neural network “teacher” can prepare a system 
(i.e., to set connection weights between neurons 
form outside), while for animals this is impossible. 
All “teachers’” acts can be perceived only through 
pattern recognition.
Thus, a child can “learn” only what he is ready 
to absorb, for which he already has all necessary 
programs, and training is only available to launch 
such programs in a timely manner and to launch 
programs that are needed in the near future.
In (Melkikh, 2014a) basic methods of solving 
problems in AI are considered and it is shown that 
all of these methods are based on the use of a priori 
information. In addition to neural networks we list 
the following tools:
1. Heuristic methods of problem solving are based 
on aprioristic information of the object domain 
that comprises a problem. Heuristics may prove 
to be incapable of finding a solution altogether. 
This limitation cannot be removed even from the 
best heuristics (Garey and Johnson, 1978). A key 
question concerns how heuristics arise. The theory 
does not address questions of how we can develop 
a new heuristic.
2. The recursive search represents a natural means 
of realizing such strategies of artificial intelligence 
through a graph search. However, an exact 
objective should be set for this method to be used. 
When objects (or even one object) are not defined, 
a recursive procedure cannot be applied (Luger, 
2003).
3. Production systems are used for conflict 
resolution. In this case, the system requires an a 
priori standard sample (pattern) that determines 
the possibility of using the rules of production 
systems (Luger, 1994). 
4. Expert systems are based on the same rules (Luger 
2003). The core of an expert system is a knowledge 
base that includes knowledge generated from 
a particular applied domain. Knowledge in an 
object domain determines and updates an expert 
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database (Minsky, 1987). Can we possibly imagine 
a system that acts as an expert for itself? This 
is clearly not possible because a code can be 
corrected only when correct knowledge is known.
5. Recently, hybrid connectionist-symbolic systems 
based on a synthesis of neural networks and based 
on symbolic representations of knowledge (see 
for example, Vilhelm et al., 2000; Kamsu-Foguem 
et al., 2012; d’Avila Garcez et al., 2009) have been 
proposed. These systems facilitate knowledge 
acquisition through a variety of applications. 
However, the term “knowledge acquisition” is 
defined for such a system in a different sense than 
it is in this article. In the context of this approach, 
“knowledge acquisition” denotes that with help of 
knowledge, some useful tasks can be completed 
(e.g., in medicine). The functioning of such systems 
a priori assumes that all characters (or simple 
signals) or words written in a specific language are 
recognized by a human or computer. In this sense, 
they are innate. In this case, problems related 
to determining whether knowledge is innate to 
humans are not considered.
We can also consider a hybrid variant: 
interactions between the brain and machine. 
Indeed, at the moment, control technologies that 
use brain signals to control a computer cursor or 
hand prosthesis are actively being developed (see 
for example, Mathot et al., 2016). However, these 
technologies do not relate to the term understanding.
Thus, an analysis of main approaches to 
the problem of knowledge acquisition in artificial 
intelligence systems leads to the conclusion that in 
either case all knowledge is a priori. In the first case, 
a teacher (who can manage the system in a special 
mode) has knowledge and in the second, the system 
itself has them. No new knowledge appears in this 
case.
In (Melkikh, 2014a) it is noted that a special 
regime of system preparation can exist. As changes 
within an organism and its interactions with its 
environment are crucial when considering knowledge 
acquisition and learning, these interactions should 
be defined more precisely. Regarding processes of 
knowledge acquisition and learning, interactions 
between an organism and its environment must be 
performed only through recognition. The organism 
obtains all information on its environment through 
its senses. Furthermore, this information is subject to 
recognition, after which the organism decides what 
to do in the current situation. However, in principle, 
an organism can interact with its environment in 
another way – through preparation. The structure 
of the system can be directly changed by acting on 
it from the outside (not through the senses). This 
method is widely used in engineering systems. For 
example, a computer user can replace any part of a 
system to create a different system. However, this 
method is not related to learning or knowledge 
acquisition (as in this case another system learns); 
in addition, the method is not used in living systems. 
Thus, the system’s preparation is not considered 
further.
A possible answer to questions on the origins of 
knowledge in artificial intelligence systems concerns 
the existence of universal solvers. For example, an 
analysis of universal solvers (Hernandez-Orallo, 
2016) shows that
1. Some authors argue that there is an effective 
search method, as the interval in which a 
number (ε-acceptable policy) is located is 
known. Additionally, various search variants are 
considered. In principle, however, these search 
methods implicitly assume that the object under 
study is recognized. When it is not recognized (it 
is new), the interval in which one wishes to search 
is not known and the search space does not offer 
any potential values. 
2. The author (Hernandez-Orallo, 2016) appeals to 
evolution as a search method, as by default it is 
assumed that its opportunities to solve problems 
are unlimited. However, references to evolution 
are untenable, as we do not know how a search 
actually occurs. The assumption of the Darwinian 
search mechanism is presented with serious 
conceptual difficulties associated with a need to 
search through a large number of variants (see for 
example Melkikh, 2014c; Melkikh and Khrennikov, 
2017). The fact that this or that adaptation occurs 
in life does not say anything about the fact that a 
universal solver is used. Rather, it indicates that 
a system has a priori information on the solution 
which should be found.
3. In this connection, a question arises as to whether 
there is at least one example of an artificial 
universal solver that would work in life (with 
real objects). The practice of solving technical 
problems via intelligent systems shows that there 
are no such solvers.
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4. Recognition models appear to be fundamentally 
important. This process cannot be described 
through words alone and must be modeled.
Can an intellectual system self-improve while 
solving problems? If we could create a form of 
superintelligence that could improve itself, then this 
would be a breakthrough in the field of cognitive 
sciences. However, it is important to accurately 
define concepts. An improvement made in one area 
does not imply anything about improving work in 
another area. In (Yampolskiy, 2014; 2015), various 
forms of intellectual system self-improvement are 
considered:
- self-modification (1),
- self-improvement (self-adaptation) (2),
- recursive self-improvement (3).
The purpose of the first method is to protect 
the program itself and not to improve it.
The second concerns the goal of many software 
products to adjust the system to the user. For 
example, genetic algorithms optimize parameters for 
the analysis of a particular system through various 
learning algorithms such as meta-calculations.
The third allows one to replace an algorithm 
with a new algorithm. The author notes that this 
approach has not yet been employed. In this regard, 
it should be noted that this third method of self-
improvement cannot be implemented in principle, 
as an algorithm must replace the algorithm that the 
new algorithm must contain a priori.
Bayes hypotheses and trial and error method
As noted above, the trial and error method is 
considered a common method of learning used by 
humans and animals. In some cases, a human needs 
to make only a few attempts to learn something. 
However, why does such a method work? Let us 
show that the working capacity of the trial and error 
method is closely related to Bayesian hypotheses that 
underlie it. We write the Bayesian formula as follows:
( ) ( ) ( )( )
P A P B / A
P A/ B =
P B
,                        (3)
Under A and B we have the following:
P (A) is the a priori probability of hypothesis A;
P (A / B) is the probability of hypothesis A 
occurring with the occurrence of event B (a posteriori 
probability);
P (B / A) is the probability of event B occurring 
with the truth of hypothesis A;
P (B) is the probability of event B occurring.
If the hypothesis put forward (explicitly or 
implicitly) is valid (good, corresponds to reality), 
then probability P (A / B) should be high. This means 





P A/ B  ,
steps, which is a small number. However, questions 
then arise as to where this hypothesis comes from. 
Why is this hypothesis valid in any sense? As a natural 
and non-contradictory answer to this question, the 
hypotheses themselves are congenital or are derived 
from inborn knowledge based on rules of inference. 
Trials and errors in this case are only a consequence 
of a lack of such knowledge due to uncertainties 
related to the environment. Information obtained 
through experiments and the number of experiments 
the must be conducted to obtain such information 
are related (see appendix 1).
A priori information can be calculated from 
the Shannon formula based on a priori probability. 
Thus, a good hypothesis is a hypothesis that contains 
a considerable amount of a priori information on 
the learning object. This information cannot arise 
through the learning process but should be a priori, 
i.e., congenital. However, this means that knowledge 
is not acquired through such a process and only 
applies a priori knowledge most appropriate to the 
given situation. When a human (animal) immediately 
understands what is before him and which actions 
must be taken without trial and error (insight), then 
this is possible only when the human already knew 
this in advance (i.e., enough a priori information was 
available on the object). Whether a human perceives 
this process or not is another matter.
If, as a result of using the trial and error method, 
the results of these trials (experiments) accumulate, 
then repetition can be applied to reduce errors. In 
(Melkikh, 2014a) the model of errors at recognition 
is considered. According to (Melkikh, 2014a), errors 
occur each time a device measures its environment, 
potentially leading to erroneous recognition. 
Therefore, the larger the degree of measurement 
error, the smaller the fitness Φ value (fitness is at a 
maximum when errors are absent). We refer to the 
maximum fitness level as Φ0. Then we can write the 
following (when errors are relatively small):
81
eISSN 1303-5150 www.neuroquantology.com
NeuroQuantology | January 2019| Volume 17 | Issue 01 | Page 72-96| doi: 10.14704/nq.2019.17.01.1904
Melkikh AV., Quantum Metalanguage and The New Cognitive Synthesis
0Φ = Φ −∆ ,
where Δ is a positive value denoting a decrease in 
fitness resulting from a measurement error. From 
error theory we know that random error decreases 
with repeated measurements as the number of 
measurements increases (when systematic inaccuracy 
is present, it can be included in the maximum fitness 
value). However, each measurement requires energy 
to complete and as a result fitness values will 
decrease. We denote a decrease in fitness resulting 
from energy expended for a single measurement as 
ε. Then we have the following formula for the fitness 
value:
0 n n
ε ∆Φ = Φ − − ,                                            (4)
where n is the number of measurements.
Factor 1/ n  appears with a decrease in 
the random error value occurring from repeated 
measurements. This formula can be used when 
the measurement time is short compared to the 
characteristic behavior time. Alternatively, when 
measurements are collected slowly, the fitness 
value will decrease because the organism will not 
have enough time to measure rapid changes in the 
environment.
The fitness value (4) may have an extremum 





∆ =  
 
,
( ) ( ) 1/3 1/3 1/30 2/3
1, , 2
2
X Y X Y ε  Φ = Φ − ∆ + 
 
.
As the number of measurements is an integer, 
the extremum exists only at Δ/ε > 2. Therefore, an 
organism, which occupies a complex environment, 
may find it unfavorable to immediately change its 
behavior as its environment is altered and instead 
might prefer to perform a set of measurements 
and only then begin to act. In other words, to 
initiate available programs an organism should first 
recognize its environment and identify necessary 
programs.
This behavior explains the fact that living 
organisms form conditioned reflexes most often 
as a result of the recurrence of an external signal. 
Thus, repeated measurements of the state of the 
environment from an organism decrease errors 
during the operation of aprioristic programs.
What is innate?
To understand mechanisms of acquiring knowledge 
it is important to clarify the question of what can 
be attributed to the innate in living and artificial 
systems.
What is innate? The answer to this question 
is quite complex. Even within the framework of 
cognitive sciences, no unambiguous definition of 
innate is given.
By the term instinct, as applied to the behavior 
of animals and humans, we refer to complex 
stereotyped forms of activity that are inherent of all 
individuals of this species and that are inherited and 
do not require training. Instinct represents a form 
of species memory passed down from generation to 
generation by inheritance. The behaviors of animals 
and humans involve a complex interlacing of innate 
and acquired skills.
Ethologists define instincts as specialized 
morphological structures (a temporary organ of 
the animal) that naturally appear in a specific social 
situation (Lorenz, 1950). An instinctive reaction 
is realized automatically with any presentation of 
specific stimuli and is not corrected by circumstances 
of the given context or by the animal’s past 
experiences. In this case, innate response circuits are 
triggered.
For example, Samuels (2004) considers several 
definitions of innateness. The author notes that the 
theory of innateness has been used to explain many 
psychic phenomena. However, the concept should 
be better defined. The author considers several 
definitions of innateness:
 ȇ Innateness as non-acquisition. Is universal 
grammar innate? However, non-acquisition is 
also poorly defined. Minimum definition is: a 
characteristic is acquired from an object (e.g., an 
organism) when and only when there is a period 
of time in which an object has the characteristic in 
question and a prior period in which it does not. 
However, this is not enough, as at development all 
cognitive abilities are absent.
 ȇ  Innateness as a presence at birth. That is they are 
acquired in the minimal sense - during growth. 
However, it is possible to train prior to birth. 
Sexual signs are also absent (in part) at birth.
 ȇ Innateness as a consequence of internal causes.
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 ȇ Innateness as genetic determinism. However, here 
it is impossible to trace a clear causal relationship.
 ȇ Innateness as an invariant of development.
 ȇ Innateness as something that has not been taught. 
We in turn require a clear definition of training.
There are two prior opposing theories that 
link behavior to genotypes. One theory conditionally 
referred to as “behaviorism” denies the importance 
of genes. However, another (“genetic determinism”) 
states that genes completely determine behavior.
At present these extreme views have not been 
confirmed. Studies of the individual development 
of organisms show that in different environments 
the same genotype can be expressed differently, 
and the phenotypes and behaviors of animals and 
humans depend not only on genes but also on the 
environment (see for example Argawal, 2001; 
Whitman and Agrawal, 2009).
For example, the study of the IQs of 
monozygotic twins (see for example, Butcher et al., 
2008) unambiguously shows that genes play an 
important role in intelligence. However, as shown 
by experiments, identifying genes responsible 
for specific aspects of behavior (e.g., learning) 
is difficult even for the simplest organisms. For 
example, Glanzman (2010) notes that the presence 
of molecular pathways is not sufficient to understand 
learning. Examples of Aplisia and Drosophila behavior 
show that molecules such as GABA and glutamate 
are associated with neuronal plasticity. However, 
by themselves molecules cannot explain behaviors 
without consideration of neural networks. «The take-
home lesson from the two studies discussed here is 
that knowledge of the key molecular players does not 
provide a short cut to understanding memory and 
cognition» (Glanzman, 2010). This conclusion can be 
attributed to other organisms and behaviors.
According to experiments on human genome 
mapping, a very small number of genetic markers are 
related to intelligence test results (see, for example, 
Coleman et al., 2018; Hill et al., 2018).
Thus, an organism can change its phenotype in 
response to changes in its environment (phenotypic 
plasticity). If we consider behavior, the special 
case of phenotypic plasticity can be considered as 
a form of neuroplasticity, as rooted in changes in 
connections between neurons and in the strength of 
synaptic contacts (synaptic plasticity) influenced by 
experience. Many mechanisms of synaptic plasticity 
are common among vertebrates and invertebrates 
(see for example, Glanzman, 2010).
Noble (2006) examined the relationship 
between different levels of causality in cells. In his 
view, genes do not represent a program because 
many properties of an organism (cells) can be 
realized only at the higher systems level. However, 
mechanisms of this higher level remain unclear. Does 
this level involve the use of algorithms? If so, where 
do they come from, and if not, how does it work?
Various researchers (for example, Fodor, Pask, 
Osherson) have suggested that some concepts of 
human language are congenital. In this case, however, 
formation mechanisms of remaining concepts remain 
unclear.
For example, Fodor (1983) suggested that 
there is a special language of thinking referred to as 
mentaliz. According to Fodor, mentaliz is unique in 
that it cannot be learned from one’s native language, 
as it is innate. This applies, in his opinion, to a number 
of other concepts (e.g., BACHELOR, EFFECT, ISLAND, 
TRAPEZOID, WEEK) that the author attributes to 
primitive and innate. It remains unclear, however, 
how other concepts arise.
Fodor and Pylyshyn (2016) explored an 
analogy between thinking and computers based on 
computation: “Cognitive processes are computations, 
which is to say that they apply to ....” This analogy 
also means that cognitive processes must be based 
on innate knowledge, as computers work this way.
Chomsky’s theory (see, for example, Chomsky, 
1957; 1965) posits that language involves the use 
of deep and surface structures. Surface structures 
‘face outward’ as represented by spoken utterances 
while deep structures ‘face inward’ and express 
underlying relations between words and conceptual 
meanings. Transformational grammar is generative 
grammar that applies a limited series of rules 
expressed in mathematical notation that transforms 
deep structures into well-formed surface structures. 
Transformational grammar thus relates meaning 
and sound. 
The Chomsky hierarchy is a hierarchy of 
classes of formal grammar. The hierarchy imposes 
a logical structure to different language classes and 
provides a basis for understanding the relationship 
between grammars (devices that enumerate valid 
sentences within languages). In order of increasing 
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expressive power, it considers regular, context-
free, context-sensitive, and recursively enumerable 
grammars. Each class represents a strict subset of the 
class above it, i.e., each successive class can generate 
a broader set of formal languages. 
Later versions of Chomsky’s theory (the 
minimalist program, Chomsky, 2015) make strong 
statements on universal grammar. According to his 
view, grammatical principles underlying languages 
are innate and unchanged, and differences between 
languages  of the world can be explained in terms 
of parametric brain settings that can be compared 
to switches. According to this point of view, a child 
must learn lexical units (i.e., words) and morphemes 
to learn a language and must determine necessary 
parameter values in reference to several key 
examples.
This approach, according to Chomsky, 
explains the amazing speed at which children 
can learn languages, consistent stages of child 
language learning regardless of languages learned, 
and characteristic errors that children make while 
learning their native language and seemingly logical 
errors that are not made. According to Chomsky, the 
absence or occurrence of such errors is related to the 
method used: generalized (innate) or dependent on a 
specific language.
Chomsky notes that the infinite number of 
proposals that a human can make serves as a strong 
reason to reject the behaviorist concept of language 
teaching by reinforcing (fixing) conditioned reflexes. 
Young children can make new proposals not backed 
by past behavioral experience. The understanding 
of language is conditioned less by past experiences 
than by the so-called Language Acquisition Device, 
the internal structure of the human psyche. The 
mechanism of language learning determines the 
volume of permissible grammatical constructions and 
helps a child master new grammatical constructions 
from the language he has heard.
According to the author, congenital grammars 
arose through random mutation. However, 
mechanisms for the emergence of other language 
concepts remain unclear.
According to Chomsky meaning are hard-
wired already somewhere inside the computational 
device. In his opinion meaning are independent of 
social purposes, arising from genetically determined 
syntactic structure.
Chomsky’s theory has been challenged by 
many authors through theory theory (Gopnik, 2003; 
Gopnik, 2012) and usage-based theory (Tomasello, 
2009), for example.
According to Tomasello (2009), the innate 
grammatical module does not help a child assimilate 
his first language as much as different mechanisms of 
thinking, such as the ability to distribute objects into 
categories and to understand how they are related. 
Children begin by mastering simple grammatical 
schemes and then comprehend the rules that govern 
them. According to usage-based theory (Tomasello, 
2009), children intuitively guess the intentions of 
other people. A child learns standard schemes by 
watching other people. Thus, in the author’s opinion, 
the cognitive abilities of the brain serve as decisive 
factors of language learning. However, in light of that 
stated above with respect to problems of knowledge 
acquisition, these abilities must be explained. What, 
for example, does the term “assimilate” mean? How 
specifically does cognitive ability work with language 
when a child is exposed to a new environment?
According to theory theory (see for example, 
Gopnik, 2003; 2012), while obtaining knowledge 
about the world, children use the same tools as 
adults do when testing scientific principles. Children 
develop theories. According to the author (Gopnik 
2003, 2012), infants are born with initial innate 
theories. However, the range of theories that can 
be generated is much wider than the limited set of 
representations that are possible from innate views. 
We learn by modifying, revising and eventually 
replacing earlier theories with later ones.
Theory theory is primarily applied to our 
everyday knowledge of the world, to our everyday 
understanding of biology, physics, psychology etc.
A significant drawback of the theory theory 
and the usual theory of language is their lack of basis 
in models and inaccurate definition of terms. What, 
for example, occurs when modifying one’s original 
knowledge? How do we create new theories?
From this connection a question arises as to 
where theories of science come from (especially in 
the case of mathematics). Wigner (1967) explored 
the inexplicable effectiveness of mathematics. 
According to Wigner, mathematics is smarter than 
us. This means that the laws of mathematics and 
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We show that the creation of concepts 
and generalizations is contradictory in principle 
regardless of the material basis of an intellectual 
system.
Creation of new concepts, abstraction and inductive 
logic
Let us consider several properties of thinking that 
are considered classical: the ability to generalize, 
intuition, abstraction, the creation of new concepts, 
and others. These concepts are at the core of human 
intellect and perhaps of the intelligence of animals. On 
the other hand, these properties are highly difficult (if 
not impossible) to apply on a computer (an intelligent 
system). Indeed, for example, abstraction modeling 
methods (Goertzel, 1993) inevitably suggest that 
a concept that should appear as a result of such an 
abstraction must be a priori defined in a mathematical 
model. Consequently, the implementation of such a 
model within an intellectual system also does not 
lead to the formation of a real abstraction.
In classical experiments with animals and 
young children (Gellerman, 1933) their abilities to 
form general concepts were measured. It is shown 
that children can identify the notion of “triangularity” 
in consideration triangles of different textures, colors, 
etc. That is, children (and some animals) are able to 
identify common geometric shapes and to recognize 
these commonalities in a new figure. Note, however, 
that when an image is recognized, it is translated 
into a mathematical (abstract) form. That is, along 
with other characteristics of an image, the property 
of “triangularity” is also recognized. Otherwise, it is 
impossible to explain how such a notion could have 
“formed” if it had not been programmed in advance. 
As is shown above, the trial and error method can 
be effective only when it is based on a hypothesis 
that is close to the truth a priori. Therefore, the trial 
and error method implicitly includes the Bayesian 
approach.
Lake and co-authors (2015) noted that two 
features of human thinking cannot be realized by 
computer systems. A human can learn a new concept 
with one attempt while a machine must make dozens 
or hundreds of attempts. Even children can make 
generalizations with one attempt. While learning, 
individuals can identify new options, functions and 
categories. Machines cannot do this. How do people 
learn from such a small amount of data? To address 
this problem, the authors proposed a Bayesian 
learning program that in their opinion supports 
the generalization and learning of new concepts. 
In this case, new programs can be developed from 
components of past ones.
However, in this case, the generalization and 
creation of new concepts is something quite different. 
If we consider signs registered by a system as images, 
then they can be processed in various ways, and from 
them it is possible to form new images, etc. However, 
this new image does not have semantics, such that 
one does not know what it displays. Accordingly, it 
reflects not the creation of a concept but the creation 
of a new sign. Operations of “averaging” signs can of 
course also be carried out. As a result, from a set of 
signs one can identify common features and form 
an “average” sign. However, as what it means is not 
known (the semantics are not averaged), the system 
cannot take any adequate action in this case. Thus, a 
generalization cannot be made at the syntactic level, 
as the semantics of these symbols are determined in 
a completely different way.
Consider for this connection the operation of 
“generalization.” Let there be images in the external 
environment. After recognition, they correspond to 
concepts A1, ... An of the internal language. When an 
image is not recognized, it is impossible to carry out 
operations related to semantics (i.e., it is discarded). 
Generalization means that all concepts belong to 
a certain set. In this case, two options are possible. 
Either they already belong to it and a priori there are 
operations adequate for this set (i.e., what to do with 
this set as the whole), or they do not belong to this 
set. In the latter case, the operation of replenishing 
the set with the object is not defined.
The problem of knowledge acquisition can 
also be considered based on logic. According to 
classical logic, to realize a proposition (that includes 
a subject, predicate, bundle and quantifier), all of 
its components must be a priori determined. This 
is often implicitly implied, but for our purposes it is 
necessary to note the importance of such an a priori 
definition. It is impossible to form a judgment of an 
unknown (unrecognized) object. Logical conclusions 
can be divided into inductive and deductive 
conclusions (see, for example, Baronett, 2008). It 
is assumed that deductive conclusions are strict 
while inductive conclusions are only probabilistic. 
Bertrand Russell noted (1998) that deduction does 
not give rise to new knowledge. New knowledge can 
only be obtained through induction. The problem of 
inductive inference has been raised repeatedly in 
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the field of philosophy. In particular, David Hume 
denied the validity of induction completely. On 
this connection Bertrand Russell remarked: “What 
these arguments prove is ... that induction is an 
independent logical principle that cannot be deduced 
from experience or from other logical principles, and 
that without this principle, science is impossible.”
The analogy in logic is also regarded as a 
form of inference (see, for example, Baronett 2008), 
though its conclusions on induction are probabilistic. 
This probability value can be calculated from the 
Bayesian formula. However, as noted above, for 
this probability to be as great as possible, “good” 
hypotheses on which the Bayes formula itself is 
based must be applied. It remains unclear what are 
the mechanisms of a good hypothesis generation. 
The existence of such a hypothesis has only been 
postulated.
In the framework of formal (mathematical) 
logic, induction is also present (e.g., in Peano 
arithmetic). However, such induction can only work 
when all of its variants are determined in advance. 
Mathematical induction cannot work with objects 
that are not defined. Sometimes such a definition is 
given implicitly, but it does exist in any case.
Within the framework of logic, complete and 
incomplete induction are distinguished. Most often, 
induction is incomplete, and as shown above an 
unambiguous conclusion cannot be drawn from it.
In the case of complete induction we draw 
conclusions from a full enumeration of species of a 
certain genus on the whole genus; it is obvious that 
in using such a method of inference we obtain a quite 
reliable conclusion, and this method of inference 
cannot raise any doubts. In identifying the subject of 
a logical group with objects of particular judgments, 
we can apply this definition to the whole group.
The scheme of complete induction can be 
written as follows:
1. Set Ω consists of elements Ω1, Ω2, ..., Ωk.
2. Where Ω1 has characteristic ψ, where Ω2 has 
characteristic ψ, and where all elements of Ω3 to Ωk 
have characteristic ψ.
3. Consequently, all elements of set Ω have 
characteristic ψ.
In relation to the problem of knowledge 
acquisition, this situation can be interpreted as 
follows: in the case of acquiring knowledge, we 
always deal with a new object. As shown above, the 
reliability of inductive outputs is directly dependent 
on a priori information on this object. When a priori 
information is completely absent, no inductive 
conclusions can be drawn on the object.
If, from this point of view, we consider complete 
induction, it becomes equivalent to mathematical 
induction from which it is possible to draw definite 
conclusions, but induction can be complete only 
when all the elements of sets are determined a 
priori. In this case, no acquisition of knowledge (and 
understanding, the creation of new concepts, etc.) 
can occur in principle.
In general, we can conclude that mathematical 
logic and set theory are most closely related to 
thinking as such. The paradoxes of set theory and 
mathematical logic reflect the incompleteness of our 
knowledge. Namely, our thinking occurs partly in a 
latent form. At the same time, part of our thinking 
is not realized. Thus, some of the mathematical 
evidence is implicitly implied. We simply know that 
mathematics (e.g., an infinite set of real numbers) is 
constructed in this manner and not otherwise.
Consider the abstraction of identification as 
a means of forming general abstract concepts. This 
method involves taking into account only differences 
that for a given situation and for one reason or 
another are essential and in ignoring others and 
that are insignificant when considering initial 
objects. Initial objects that differ in an insignificant 
way are considered to be the same, and in terms 
of speech aspects, the abstraction of identification 
is manifested in the fact that two identical source 
objects when identified can be referred to as the 
same abstract object by applying the corresponding 
term. The following examples can be considered
• The identification of identical figures leads to 
the generation of an abstract figure (an abstract 
word);
• The identification of an equivalent fundamental 
sequence of rational numbers leads to the 
generation of a real number;
• The identification of isomorphic groups leads to 
the generation of an abstract group.
However, the word leads does not say anything 
about mechanisms facilitating the appearance of 
such concepts. It is much more logical to assume that 
concepts of “abstract letters,” “abstract groups,” etc. 
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already exist. As a special case, they must contain an 
isomorphic group, a rational number, and a letter. 
Therefore, when abstracting, a human only discovers 
such general concepts and does not create them.
Epistemology identifies various kinds of 
correct statements (see for example, Audi, 2011). 
There are self-evident statements and statements 
that are based on experience. Concerning the latter, 
however, one must bear in mind that all empirical 
must be recognized. Therefore, it is implicitly 
based on hypotheses that are postulated. That is, 
it is based on a priori knowledge. Analytical and 
synthetic correctness are also considered. Analytical 
correctness is obtained from proof. However, this is 
then just part of mathematical logic, for which the 
acquisition of new knowledge is impossible. Self-
evident statements are innate by definition.
The problem of knowledge acquisition as a 
part of philosophy has a long history. In particular, 
the notion that knowledge is to some extent 
predetermined arose a very long time ago.
Socrates believed that soul is immortal (and 
repeatedly incarnated) and that the acquisition of 
knowledge is only an anamnesis. According to the 
ideas of Spinoza and Leibniz, thinking is a spiritual 
automaton that produces truth and that works 
according to a pre-set, pre-determined program. 
However, this raises questions as to where in such 
automaton errors come from. Descartes postulated 
that there is freedom of will according to which 
decisions are not predetermined.
Kant considered such categories innate and that 
the creative method works based on them. However, 
what is the creative method? This term remains 
poorly defined and does not clarify mechanisms of 
the emergence of new knowledge.
Kant asserted: “If we have a green leaf before 
us, our mind, comparing it with other leaves and 
considering through the prism of the category of 
universality, develops the concept of a leaf in general 
with the help of a productive imagination.” This raises 
questions regarding what productive imagination is. 
What is universality? How does the mind define a 
category? Kant could not provide answers to these 
questions. To date progress in this area has been 
limited.
Any reasoning is formulated based on 
elementary operations of a certain language. 
Elementary logical operations can be performed 
by classical and quantum systems. In quantum 
mechanics, operations are performed on qubits. 
Simple unitary operations over qubits are called 
quantum logical gates. For example, when a 
qubit passes from one state to another, 00 → , 
( )1exp1 tiω→  then it is said that after time t a qubit 
acts on the gate
Any reasoning is formulated on the basis of 
elementary operations within a certain language. 
Elementary logical operations can be performed by 
both classical and quantum systems. In quantum 
mechanics, operations are performed on qubits. 
Simple unitary operations over qubits are called 
quantum logical gates. For example, if a qubit passes 
from one state to another, 00 → , ( )1exp1 tiω→  
then it is said that after a time t the gate 










acted on a qubit.
As other elementary quantum gates one can 
identify “equivalence,” “not,” etc. All of these gates 
act on one qubit and can be realized by means of 
some Hamiltonian of the Schrodinger equation. More 
detailed formalisms of quantum logic are described 
for example in (Haven and Khrennikov, 2017).
It is necessary, however, to emphasize that 
problems of justifying logic are not related to which 
particular model of logic (quantum or classical) is 
used. Thus, the problem of knowledge acquisition 
from a logical point of view cannot be solved within 
the framework of a given language either based on 
quantum theory or based on classical logic. Rather, 
for any language there is no means to justify the 
acquisition of knowledge.
Can neurophysiology provide an answer to the 
question of understanding and thinking?
If behavioral programs are innate, this in one 
way or another should be reflected in the structure 
of the brain.
The relationship between congenital programs 
of behavior and the structure of the brain is discussed 
in a previous book (Sverdlik, 2016). According to 
the author, the whole organism can be conditionally 
divided into two axes. The first axis includes our 
internal organs and tissues, and the second axis, the 
external axis, includes the skin and the sense organs. 
Accordingly, we can distinguish two divisions of the 
nervous system as follows: the autonomic (serving 
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the inner life of the organism) and the somatic 
(serving the external life) nervous system.
Different divisions of the brain are more or 
less involved in the process of the perception of the 
surrounding world and thinking.
The hypothalamus is the central regulator of 
the internal axis. The hypothalamus regulates the 
endocrine activity of the brain and the homeostasis 
of the body including processes such as food control, 
protective behavior, thirst, thermoregulation, 
memory, emotions, etc. (see for example, Swanson 
2000; Canteras 2002).
The amygdala is involved in emotional and 
social processes (discrimination of faces, etc.) 
(Kheirbeck and Hen, 2011; Todorov and Engell, 
2008).
The cortical mantle of the large hemispheres 
is the regulator of the outer axis. Conscious abstract 
thinking is carried out by stereotypes of the external 
axis. The resolving power of the autonomic nervous 
system is low and that of the somatic nervous system 
is high. Conscious thinking operates in working 
memory, in which there is a simultaneous retention 
of several pieces of information.
In the author’s opinion, the neurophysiological 
meaning of abstraction is that, from the long and 
entangled neural networks short networks (that 
generalize their content) are formed. Here, however, 
an important question arises about the mechanisms 
of the formation of such networks. This mechanism 
should be a consequence of some physical processes.
According to the author (Sverdlik, 2016), the 
goal of abstraction is to find something common, 
which unified different information. The cortex 
works inaccurately, so the precision of mathematics 
does not depend on it. The limbic system is the 
basis of emotions. It is possible to attribute some 
neurobiological address to emotions. The emotional 
brain is the place in which the inner axis reaches the 
maximum contact with the external axis. There, the 
body and the cortex (algorithmic mind) find many 
points of contact. Emotions invisibly participate in 
solving any abstract problems.
In the author’s opinion, to find the right solution 
for any problem means to recognize it as the right 
one. Recognition is controlled by the limbic (sensory) 
system. Neurons of the limbic system generate a 
sense of recognition when external information 
coincides with inner information. At the same time, 
the bodily component of cognition is important.
According to the author, true discovery is 
impossible without the use of non-algorithmic 
instruments. The body is not capable of constructing 
logical chains, and internal information is encoded 
somewhere in the molecules. Intuition is the 
emergence of a solution without the participation of 
working memory.
At the same time, however, the question 
arises as to why the body should be considered 
non-algorithmic. After all, the algorithm, in the 
most general sense, should describe all continuous 
processes.
On the other hand, non-algorithmicity (if it 
exists) simply means that this knowledge already 
exists.
To address the questions of understanding 
and consciousness, Koch and Tononi (2008) took a 
neurobiological point of view. Studying the activity of 
the brain with the help of a tomograph, the authors 
singled out the neuronal correlates of consciousness. 
The authors proposed an informational theory of 
consciousness, the main provisions of which are the 
following two statements:
1. Consciousness is a high informativity. Every 
private conscious state excludes a large number of 
other states.
2. Conscious information is unified.
If you present different images to a computer, 
the understanding of what is depicted or what looks 
wrong would allow a computer to pass a Turing test. 
However, according to the authors, the creation of a 
universal system that understands what is in front 
of it is impossible. However, progress in solving 
complex problems is attributed to the construction 
of computers that are organized similarly to the 
mammalian brain.
It remains unclear, however, how the proposed 
postulates help to understand how understanding 
arises in the event that a human meets an unknown 
image. How does the complexity of the brain and the 
large number of connections between neurons lead 
to understanding?
Quantum intelligence and quantum metalanguage
A number of authors associate the solution of a 
number of problems of the intellect with quantum 
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mechanics. These approaches can be divided into 
main motivations, i.e., reasons that, in the opinion 
of the authors, make the application of quantum 
mechanics to the thinking process promising. In 
my opinion, the most significant motivations are as 
follows.
One of the important areas of the application of 
quantum mechanics to cognitive sciences is decision 
making. This is an actively developing field that 
includes many researchers. The main motivation here 
is the decision, with the help of quantum mechanics, of 
some paradoxes of decision making. Such paradoxes, 
for example, include the Ellsberg paradox, which is a 
violation of the sure-thing principle and others. In the 
opinion of different authors, it is quantum mechanics 
that makes it possible to explain decision making in 
situations that the classical probability theory cannot 
explain. The most important property of quantum 
probabilities is that, in addition to the usual classical 
probabilities, they contain interference terms related 
to the wave character of quantum particles.
In the frame of «quantum-like consciousness» 
Khrennikov (2010a) proposed, that the brain 
performs “computation-thinking” by using algorithms 
of quantum computing in the complex Hilbert space 
of mental quantum-like models. Evolution of mental 
wave function in the frame of this model can be 









bH V a= +  - is the operator of «mental 
energy», â and  b̂ - are two self-adjoint operators, 
and ( )ˆV a - is the «mental potential». As will be 
shown below, the Hilbert space can be represented 
in the form of a subspace in which the metalanguage 
operates.
The application of Bohmian version of quantum 
mechanics to the processes of thinking is caused by 
the fact, that the pilot wave (on the concept of which 
Bohm’s quantum mechanics is largely based) can, 
to some extent, be considered the simplest form 
of consciousness. For example, Pylkkanen (2016) 
believes that some properties of quantum systems can 
help to understand the properties of consciousness. 
The pilot wave carries active information and, in a 
sense, informs the particle about its surroundings. 
According to the author, consciousness exists only 
because there is a higher level of information. This last 
remark can be attributed not only to consciousness 
but also to thinking in general. In the works of 
Khrennikov, mental information fields were defined 
in the “information space”, reflecting a hierarchic 
tree-like representation of information by cognitive 
systems (mathematically, such mental trees can 
be represented with p-adic numbers (Khrennikov, 
2010b).
A second quantization method is also 
promising for quantum-like modeling in which 
particle creation and annihilation operators are used 
(Bagarello, 2012; Bagarello et al., 2017). In this case, 
these operators can be used to create or destroy the 
simplest information units of decision making, such 
as “Yes” or “No”.
The application of quantum mechanics to 
thinking can also be justified by the fact that the 
brain itself, on the basis of which thought is realized, 
functions as a quantum system. In previous works 
(Melkikh 2014b; Melkikh and Meijer, 2018), it was 
shown that the work of neurons at the molecular 
level is contradictory. This phenomenon is reflected 
in the fact that the accuracy of the biochemical 
reactions of protein-ligand and protein-protein 
interactions, as well as the accuracy of the folding 
of proteins and DNA (RNA), cannot be justified by 
the presence of short-range potentials between 
biologically important molecules. In this case, the 
entangled (in the classical sense) and the inoperable 
states of macromolecules should be realized with 
an overwhelming probability. In particular, this will 
lead to the impossibility of the efficient transport of 
substances both inside neurons and through their 
membranes. This phenomenon (formulated by the 
authors as a generalized Levinthal’s paradox) requires 
a fundamental revision in the understanding of the 
mechanisms of the work of cells at the molecular 
level. To solve the paradox, the authors proposed a 
quantum model of intermolecular interactions. The 
most significant point of this model is the long-range 
interaction, which ensures the efficient operation 
of intracellular molecular machines. Here, the 
motivation for using quantum mechanics is based on 
the fact that classical mechanics cannot, in principle, 
provide such an interaction.
As noted above, the motivation of Penrose’s 
proposals on the application of quantum mechanics 
is that he connects mental processes with the collapse 
of the wave function, which, in the author’s opinion, 
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is caused by the effects of gravity. Moreover, non-
computability plays an important role. According 
to the author, the ability to understand cannot be 
formalized with the help of a particular set of rules. 
The author comes to the conclusion that “for the 
establishment of mathematical truth, mathematicians 
do not apply knowingly justified algorithms.”
Is it possible to conclude from this idea that 
understanding in principle is not formalizable? Such 
a conclusion cannot be made, since unprovability 
occurs only within a certain language. There is no 
reason to say that the language we use is closed and 
unchanged.
Hence, what follows is a natural logical 
conclusion that the concept of truth (adequacy in the 
broad sense) in relation to certain constructions is 
innate. This concept is just as axiomatic as the rules 
of the language within which there is a discussion 
(modeling) of truth.
As for quantum gravity, its necessity for the 
operation of microtubules in neurons can hardly be 
justified, since the effects of quantum gravity should 
appear at much higher energies. Nevertheless, the 
concept of microtubules and the cytoskeleton as 
quantum systems is currently developing (see for 
example, Cocchi et al., 2017).
The ideas of Zizzi can, in a sense, be considered 
a continuation of Penrose’s ideas. According to Zizzi 
(2012), there are three ways of expressing mental 
activity: classical computer, quantum computer and 
a non-computational way. In the author’s opinion, 
we do not realize quantum calculations, but classical 
ones are conscious. The third way is connected with 
meta-knowledge - intuition, which is controlled by 
the quantum metalanguage. It is this language that 
distinguishes people from computers. People, in 
addition to logical rules, have meta-logical rules. We 
can agree with this, but it is necessary to clarify that 
these rules do not fundamentally differ from logical 
rules; they are simply hidden and manifest only in 
certain situations. Such properties of metalanguage 
will be discussed below in more details.
According to the author (Zizzi, 2012), a 
mathematician can uncomputably assert what 
Gödel’s theorem considers unprovable. We note that 
Gödel’s theorem addresses a closed logical system 
into which the hidden metalanguage is not included. 
Within the framework of the metalanguage, these 
statements could be completely provable. Although 
there certainly will be other unprovable statements, 
this is another matter.
In the author’s opinion, the quantum 
metalanguage governs our own language. When 
a mathematician claims the correctness of some 
statement G(F), in reality, he operates at the level of 
the quantum metalanguage.
As will be shown in the next section, the 
concept of quantum metalanguage is very important 
and can be used to solve the problem of knowledge 
acquisition and to create a new paradigm of thinking 
in general.
Discussion
Quantum metalanguage and innate programs of 
behavior
Discussion the problems of knowledge acquisition 
in the context of various sciences (epistemology, 
philosophy of science, neurocomputing and others) 
leads to the need for a new cognitive synthesis. This 
synthesis must be connected with a new answer to 
the following basic question of cognitive sciences: 
where does the knowledge come from? To this end, 
it is necessary to take advantage of all that has been 
achieved in various cognitive sciences. Previously, 
for example, Griffits (2015) proposed to consider 
the active use of computers and calculations in the 
cognitive sciences, which occurs at present as a new 
cognitive revolution. However, such use alone does 
not provide new answers to fundamental questions 
but only helps to speed up the experiments. The 
analysis of artificial intelligence, conducted in Section 
5, shows that the computer does not provide new 
knowledge.
To more accurately define the concepts related 
to thinking, the adequacy of human behavior has been 
suggested (Melkikh, 2014a). Indeed, we can verify 
only experimentally whether a human has realized 
something new and whether he could create a new 
abstract concept. In this case, the only way to verify 
this is to determine how the behavior of a human (an 
arbitrary intellectual system) has changed as a result 
of understanding. If this behavior has become, to some 
extent, more adequate than before understanding, 
then we can say that understanding really occurred. 
If no adequacy is observed, then there is no way to 
verify that understanding really occurred.
If we consider an intellectual system in the 
form of an automaton with given properties, then 
the adequacy of its behavior can be estimated, for 
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example, by the gain that this system obtains from 
interaction with the environment. The following 
model of behavior is proposed (Melkikh, 2014a):
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 , 1t t s tϕ ϕ+ = Φ +
( ) ( )( )f t F tϕ= .
Where, φ describes internal states of 
automaton, f is the action of automaton, t is the 
discrete time and s is the input variable.
The definition of knowledge acquisition of in 
accordance with the proposed model is follows:
Definition. This will be understood by 
the acquisition of knowledge of such a process, 
followed by the emergence of an environmentally 
unrecognized image c* not including preparation 
of the systems and only to provide the system with 
information regarding the external environment 
through receptors, which results in a behavior of the 
system that is estimated to increase the expectation 
of winning at some preset value of W0:
( ) 0*W c W> .
The assignment of the image to unrecognized 
objects indicates that there is no prior information 
about the object.
The hypothesis of the congenital behavior 
of animals is proposed (Melkikh, 2014), the main 
provisions of which are the following:
1. Innate programs of behavior are formed 
on the basis of genes during ontogenesis 
(morphogenesis).
The formation process of these programs is 
not obvious because, for example, in an organism, 
there is a clear discrepancy between the information 
contained in the genes and the complexity of 
the nervous system. However, the modeling of 
morphogenesis is a separate problem and is not 
considered in this paper.
2. As a result of receptors receiving signals from 
the environment, remembering and recognition 
occur.
Memory of the time or spatial distribution of the 
signals used by the organism to run a priori behavior 
programs is the most adequate for the observed 
situation. If recognition is not possible (the appeared 
image is new), then either no a priori programs start 
or the programs that correspond most closely (on the 
tree of recognition) to the recognized image are run.
3. At the presence of uncertainty in the environment 
or errors in receptors aprioristic programs run 
only after several repetitions.
Repetition can reduce random error in the 
registration signal. This situation is largely similar to 
the decrease of random errors in measurements.
4. Another response to the uncertainty of the 
environment is a trial and error method, which 
allows the system to select the most appropriate 
aprioristic behavior program.
5. An interaction with another organism that 
transfers the experience of one organism with the 
environment (see items 2-4) to another is only 
possible if both the organisms have the same a 
priori programs relating to the present situation.
6. All programs of animal behavior are innate. For 
technical systems, they are aprioristic programs.
Thus, animal learning caused by uncertainty 
in the environment is the method of choice for the a 
priori (innate) program, which is most appropriate 
for a certain situation. The new behavior program 
cannot be formed on the basis of an experience or 
interaction with other animals. This hypothesis may 
well be extended to the process of human cognition.
Thus, to learn is to choose one of the a priori 
programs most appropriate to a given case. To 
quickly understand the situation (insight) means 
to immediately choose such a program. To learn by 
trial and error means to not immediately find such 
a program because of interference, environmental 
uncertainty, etc.
To solve the problem of knowledge acquisition, 
consider the concept of metalanguage introduced 
by Tarski. It is a higher-level language that works 
with other languages. Some operations can be used 
to generate new languages from given languages. 
At the same time, operations such as concatenation, 
intersection, association and others are defined.
Suppose that such operations are defined on 
our language. These operations are defined in some 
higher-level language  L(Fig. 4).
Language L2 (our) is constantly replenished 
due to the innate quantum language L1 according 
to the rules of language L . Thus, we can build the 
following logical chain, modeling thinking as follows:
Changes in the environment → registration 
by the receptors → recognition with the L2 language 
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→ if not → recognition with the metalanguage → 
operations on the L2 language involving the image, 
such as generalization and the formation of new 
concepts → the introduction of a new character 
symbol in the L2 language (together with possible 
operations) → new knowledge. This sequence 
of actions can also be presented in the form of a 
flowchart (Fig. 5):
framework of quantum mechanics of particles, the 
following set acts as a language:
{ }ˆ, HΨ .
That is, the Hamiltonian can be considered 
as a set of operations on wave functions. However, 
generally speaking, to construct a quantum model of 
an arbitrary system, it is necessary to consider the 
quantization of the fields.
The metalanguage operates in a more general 
space, part of which is the Hilbert space of wave 
functions. The elements of the metalanguage can also 
be the creation and annihilation operators applied 
to various elements of the language. With the help 
of such operators in the language, new concepts are 
selected from a list of a priori existing concepts.
For effective functioning, a quantum 
metalanguage must have a large information 
capacity in an orders of magnitude greater than 
the capacity of any of the known languages. At 
first glance, such a requirement contradicts the 
comparatively small informational capacity of genes. 
Indeed, genomes of higher organisms contain only 
about a gigabyte of information, which is clearly 
insufficient to manage such complex behavior as 
human behavior. This contradiction can be solved 
on the basis of the assumption that the interaction 
between biologically important molecules (including 
neurons) is essentially a quantum effect (Melkikh, 
2014b; Melkikh and Meijer, 2018). As noted above, 
the essence of the proposed model is that long-
range potentials act between biologically important 
molecules, which allow the modulation of their 
movement. This additional interaction allows us 
to increase the possible information capacity of 
molecules by orders of magnitude, as well as cells 
in general, which is not related directly to genes. 
Experiments were proposed to test this hypothesis 
in previous works (Melkikh, 2014b; Melkikh and 
Meijer, 2018).
Within the framework of the new concept of 
innate behavior, we can answer the following Kant’s 
questions:
 ȇ How are synthetic judgments possible a priori?
 ȇ How is human freedom possible?
The first question can be answered as follows: 
a priori judgments are the consequences of the innate 
quantum metalanguage, which is adequate a priori to 
the existing reality.
Figure 4. Higher-level language
Figure 5. Logical chain, modeling thinking
Quantum mechanics represents the natural 
conditions for the formulation of the metalanguage, 
the discreteness of energy and states. Within the 
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The second question can be answered in such 
a way that what is considered free will is the result 
of unconscious metalanguage algorithms. If the basis 
of thinking is quantum mechanics, then this naturally 
explains the existence of probabilistic judgments 
(which seem to be arbitrariness and freedom). As is 
known, the outcome of an experiment with quantum 
particles can only be predicted probabilistically. This 
property, with respect to operations over elements 
of the language, can be treated as freedom of will.
Consider how a human learns a new language 
within the framework of the concept of innate 
behavior. From this point of view, the presence of 
Chomsky’s proposed Language Acquisition Device 
is quite natural. This is nothing other than an innate 
program of behavior. Moreover, it can be said that this 
is not a mechanism for extracting the language but 
rather a mechanism for including an innate program 
that implements the language. This applies, of 
course, not only to the native language of any person 
but to any language in general. However, we know 
that the ability to learn languages  is different among 
all people. The mechanism of this phenomenon 
within the framework of the metalanguage can be 
thought of as the following: all people have the same 
congenital programs, however, they start differently 
in the development process. This process is largely 
determined by the environment, which leads to the 
fact that some programs are not run at all. In this 
sense, the programs under which we operate are 
operational programs. Most of the programs are 
hidden and not operational. They cannot manifest 
themselves in the course of a human life.
Let the child in the appropriate situations 
(surrounding objects) be given words that correspond 
to these subjects. After numerous repetitions, the 
innate programs for working with these words are 
run. At the same time, the understanding of words 
is present a priori. The further generalization of 
concepts (words) occurs in a similar way; there is 
recognition of the fact that a given set of words refers 
to a particular (a priori) set that is characterized 
by some generalized concept. After recognition, the 
conclusion is drawn that the concept is formed. All 
programs of work with such an abstract concept 
exist a priori (they are innate).
Thus, if one considers Chomsky’s approach to 
language acquisition from this point of view, then 
it can be called more correct than, for example, 
the cognitive approach or the theory theory, since 
the latter contains many vague terms, and the 
mechanisms for mastering new terms, understanding 
new concepts and so on are contradictory. However, 
Chomsky’s approach also needs further development. 
If only a part of the language is innate, it is not clear 
where the remaining parts originate. In this case, it is 
logically consistent that the whole language is innate. 
This does not mean that the language in this case 
acts as a kind of rigid structure. A natural property of 
algorithms and computer programs written on their 
basis are operators of the following type:
if А then В, else
if С then D, else
if E then F else….
Thus, completely innate behavior allows 
to flexibly react to changes in the environment, 
including forming (which means choosing from 
ready-made concepts) various new concepts in 
different life situations.
Let us consider a simple example. How can 
a child create the concept of a square as a result of 
communication with the outside world? Let the child 
be surrounded by the following objects (Fig. 6):
At some initial stages of its development, 
generalization simply does not occur, and the child 
perceives these objects as different. However, in 
the future, the following occurs: the recognition of 
all these objects includes the congenital concept of 
a “square”. That is, with their recognition, the child, 
Figure 6. Different objects and concept of a square
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in addition to other qualities of objects, recognizes 
the objects as belonging to a set of “squares”. This 
set, with all its properties, is also innate, and the 
information and programs are written on an innate 
quantum metalanguage. At a certain stage (when 
a real need arises), these congenital programs are 
translated from the quantum metalanguage into the 
child’s language. The concept of “square” thus begins 
to work, i.е. the child begins to use this concept in 
life and in the future to more adequately address 
emerging problems.
A number of experiments to test the innate 
behavioral programs were proposed earlier 
(Melkikh, 2014a; 2014b; Melkikh and Khrennikov, 
2015). Planning and conducting such experiments is 
closely related to a precise understanding of what is 
innate (see, section 4).
In the end, only such experiments (or the like) 
can finally resolve the question of whether cognitive 
effects are quantum or quantum-like.
Thus, the new paradigm of cognitive sciences 
can be formulated in the form of the following 
provisions:
1. All human behavior is innate. It seems to us 
that, as a result of learning and gaining experience, 
we can create new concepts. However, we are just 
beginning to apply the concepts that were already 
available.
2. Bayesian learning is entirely based on good 
hypotheses. These hypotheses are good because 
they are part of innate programs of behavior that are 
adequate a priori to the surrounding world.
3. When we say that we understand something, 
it means that it seems new, recognized, and it 
corresponds to some innate standard.
4. Congenital behavior programs allow 
behavior to be flexible through multiple types of 
structures of “if ... then ...”.
Conclusion
A systems analysis of the processes of understanding, 
generalizing and knowledge acquisition leads 
to the conclusion that these processes are 
contradictory. However, their detailed consideration 
is fundamentally important for understanding 
intelligence as such. The problem of the Chinese 
Searle room is considered, and it is shown that this 
problem can be naturally solved on the basis of the 
innate knowledge of the language. In this sense 
(meaning precisely the acquisition of knowledge, not 
feelings), a human is no different from a computer.
To solve these problems and paradoxes, a 
quantum metalanguage model is proposed that 
provides cognitive function only at the expense of 
innate behavioral programs. As a result, it is possible 
to explain consistently the mechanisms of the 
emergence of new concepts and generalizations. A 
priori correct judgments are possible because they 
are correct innately. As a result of training, only a 
choice of appropriate behavioral programs occurs, 
in which all new concepts, generalizations, and so on 
are already included a priori. The fact that artificial 
intelligence systems work successfully is due to only 
one thing - a significantly increased speed of pattern 
recognition. This speed now allows the solving of 
many tasks online. However, this does not mean 
that such intellectual systems are able to acquire 
knowledge or understand something new.
Appendix 1
Connection between information, obtained in 
experiment and the number of measurements
In a previous paper (Melkikh, 2014a), the trial 
and error method as a series of experiments was 
considered, which will result in finding an adequate 
algorithm or the absence of an adequate algorithm. 
In information theory, the degree of uncertainty 
of experiment β with possible outcomes and their 











If this value equals zero, the outcome of the 
experiment is known in advance. Any measurement 
or supervision α prior to experiment β can limit the 
quantity of possible experimental outcomes and 
thus reduce a degree of its uncertainty. The fact that 
the realization of experiment α reduces a degree of 
uncertainty in experiment β is reflected through the 
conditional entropy H(β/α) of experiment β under 
the condition of α being less than (more precisely, 
less than or equal to) the initial entropy of the same 
experiment. Thus, if experiment β does not depend 
on α, the realization of α does not reduce the entropy 
of β:
( ) ( )/H Hβ α β= ,
If the result of α completely predetermines an 
outcome of β, the entropy decreases to zero: ( )/ 0H β α =
. Thus, the difference
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( ) ( ) ( ), /I H Hα β β β α= −
specifies how much the realization of experiment 
α reduces the uncertainty of experiment β. This 
difference represents the quantity of information 
in experiment β, which is contained in experiment 
α. Here, information (according to the information 
theory) is understood as the uncertainty that is 
removed when a message is received.
There is an interrelation between the number 
of experiments and the information received as 
a result of each experiment. For example, if the 
experience is found with an adequate algorithm, 
each experience corresponds to receiving one bit of 
information. Suppose that the system has n degrees 
of freedom, each of which may be in one of m states. 
If, at the beginning of the experiment, there is no a 
priori information to find an adequate algorithm, 
then we obtain the average number of steps required 
to achieve it, which is equal to the total number of 
possible states:
nN m= .
If n is sufficiently large, then the number of 
steps is exponentially large, even for m = 2.
The number of steps corresponds to Shannon 
entropy:
2 2log logH N n m= = .
In this case, each bit of a priori information 
reduces the search area in half.
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